markman at stanford.edu phone: 650-725-2427 Jordan Hall, Room 282
Ellen M. Markman is the Lewis M. Terman Professor at Stanford University. She was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2003 and to the National Academy of Sciences in 2011. She is a recipient of the American Psychological Association’s Division 7 Outstanding Mentoring Award and the American Psychological Society’s William James Lifetime Achievement Award for Basic Research.
Ellen’s research interests include the relationship between language and thought; early word learning; categorization and induction; theory of mind and pragmatics; implicit theories and conceptual change.
Ellen is especially interested in working with new students on how theory-based explanations can be effective interventions in health domains. Please see the Gripshover and Markman paper as an example of this approach.
I’m interested in how people form and think about abstract ideas. This has led me to study a variety of higher-order cognitive processes, from causal learning to moral reasoning. Currently, my interests are focused on how systems of beliefs are formed, how beliefs interact with one another, and how beliefs might be revised in light of new evidence. In a recent study, my collaborators and I found that pro-vaccine messages were more effective if they focused on the dangers of failing to vaccinate rather than the safety of vaccines. We speculate that assurances of safety may fail because they conflict with wider skeptical beliefs about medicine, but that warnings of danger succeed because they are consistent with wider beliefs about the dangers of disease.
Ellen and I are currently investigating how coherent belief systems can be supported by explanation and deeper understanding. We hope to develop educational interventions that change beliefs and support motivation for positive health behaviors like eating well and managing diseases like diabetes.
Before coming to Stanford, I received my PhD in cognitive psychology from the University of California, Los Angeles. My advisor was Keith Holyoak.
caiguo at stanford.edu Jordan Hall, Room 294
Categorization is one of our indispensable cognitive tools for making sense of the world. However, the biases, such as psychological essentialism, that exist in the processes of categorization can lead to unwanted consequences, especially in the social domain. For example, we often make assumptions about a familiar category that might not apply to the category’s “atypical” members whom we might judge negatively simply because they do not neatly fit our preconceptions about that category. How can we “outsmart” these cognitive biases we are so prone to in conducting categorization? How should we reason about category boundaries and fuzziness? Is it possible to revolutionize the system of concepts, which are mental representations of categories? And what role does language play in the cognitive processes of categorization? These are the questions I am deeply interested in. Recently, I’ve been contemplating upon the relationships between generic language and category normativity, the connections between categories and their properties, and the alternatives to the dichotomous view of certain categories. In the long run, I hope to apply my research to helping the LGBTQ community, especially in regard to people’s attitudes toward gender non-conformity.
Before coming to Stanford, I earned my BA in Psychology from Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA in 2016. During my undergraduate study, I worked as a summer research assistant under Susan Carey in the Harvard Lab for Developmental Studies and under Yarrow Dunham in the Yale Social Cognitive Development Lab.
I'm interested in how we form representations of categories, and the role that language plays in that process over the course of development. Given the infinite ways we could theoretically categorize the world, how do we develop the representations we do? How does the language we hear shape the development of those representations? And how variable and flexible are these category representations across different forms of experience? Other interests of mine include metaphor, non-literal language, and pragmatics, as well as how people usually think about traditional philosophical problems regarding identity over time.
Previously, I studied psychology and philosophy at the University of Chicago, where I worked with Daniel Casasanto in the Experience & Cognition Lab on the role of bodily experience in understanding language. During various summers, I also worked with Susan Carey at the Harvard Laboratory for Developmental Studies on language and the development of category representations, and with Frank Keil at the Yale Cognition & Development Lab on biases in causal reasoning.
I am interested in children's developing "philosophy of mind" - specifically, how children (and adults) reason about sentience, consciousness, and personhood. How do we know when we’re in the presence of a sentient creature? What is the nature and structure of the lay concept of “mind”? Answers to these questions are likely to vary across development, culture, and history, with consequences in the cognitive, social, and moral domains. Most of my work examines social reasoning through behavioral studies with US children (ages 3-10 years) and adults, but I am also interested in how cultural forces shape social-cognitive development. I also collaborate with Ellen Markman and Derek Powell on projects related to using theory-based explanations to effect behavior change by way of conceptual change, especially in the health domain.
Before coming to Stanford, I worked as a research/editorial assistant for Elizabeth Spelke at Harvard University; as a research assistant in the Center for Teaching and Learning at the University of Virginia; and as the lab manager of Kristin Shutts' Social Kids Lab at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I received a B.A. in Cognitive Science from Yale University in 2009.
I am interested in studying children's early cognition about social groups. In this vein, I have pursued two major lines of research: One line of work focuses on the cognitive mechanism, the developmental trajectory and the consequences of stereotypes about social groups. The other line of work focuses on infants’ and toddlers’ expectations of people’s obligations within and across social groups. At Stanford, Ellen and I are developing theory-based interventions to facilitate positive behaviors by changing adults’ and children’s beliefs.
Before joining Stanford, I obtained my B.S. at Zhejiang University in 2011, and my Ph.D. in Developmental Psychology at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2017, where I worked with Drs. Andrei Cimpian and Renée Baillargeon.